▸ TOMASZ POŁACIK, *Archetypal Rules: Beyond Classical Logic*[1].
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The notion of archetypal rule was introduced by Lloyd Humberstone, cf. [1]. Informally, we say that a rule r is archetypal for a logic L if, up to provability in L, r is derivable, not invertible and for any other derivable rule s there is a substitution such that the premisses of s are the instances of premisses of r and the conclusion of s is the instance of the conclusion of r. The problem of semantic characterization of archetypal rules in classical propositional logic was solved recently in [4]. Unfortunately, the approach which was applied to classical logic cannot be applied to other logics in a direct way. In this talk we survey some results and shed some light to the general problem of archetypal rules in case of intermediate logics.

[1] L. Humberstone, Archetypal forms of inference, *Synthese*, 141(1):45–76, 2004.

[2] T. Połacik, The Unique Intermediate Logic Whose Every Rule is Archetypal, *The Logic Journal of the IGPL*, 13(3):269–275, 2005.

[3] T. Połacik, Archetypal Rules and Intermediate Logics, in: M. Peliš and V. Punčochař (eds.), *The Logica Yearbook 2011*, 227–237, College Publications, London 2012.

[4] T. Połacik, L. Humberstone, Classically Archetypal Rules, *Review of Symbolic Logic* 11(2):279-294, 2018.

[1] The join work with Lloyd Humberstone.