▶ HAROLD HODES, *Ramified-types for states of affairs.*

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Assume that for any monadic predication P(u), which predicates the property being P of an object u, there is a unique state-of-affairs (which consists in u being P) which that predication represents; let —P(u)— be thatstate-of-affairs. I will give an argument that for every object u there are distinct properties being P and being Q such that *P(u)* = *Q(u)*. Conisder the following impredicative second-order comprehension principle: (G) some X every y (X(y) iff some Z (y=*Z(u)* and not Z(y))).

So far, no problem. But one might think that states-of-affairs have constituents, and that the following principle of constituency is true for any u and any property being P: (C) The constituents of*P(u)* are exactly u and being P.

By (C), the only constituents of *P(u)* are u and being P, and the only constituents of *Q(u)* are u and being Q, which entails that being P = being Q.

We could reject (C), at least in its full generality. Or we could say that (G) is defective. The former leads to a novel version of logical-atomist metaphysics. The latter points to a (to my knowledge) novel form of ramification.